This contribution discusses Leibniz's views on key Christian doctrines which were surrounded, in the early modern period, by particularly lively debates. The first section delves into his defence of the Trinity and the Incarnation against the charge of contradiction, and his exploration of metaphysical models capacious enough to accommodate these mysteries. The second section focuses on the resurrection and the Eucharist with special regard to their connections with Leibniz's metaphysics of bodies. The third section investigates Leibniz's position on predestination, grace, salvation, and damnation. It comes to the conclusion that salvation, for Leibniz, does not ultimately depend on believing a set of true doctrines, but on a practical attitude: the love of God above all things. Leibniz's theology is thus fundamentally a theology of love which is ultimately practical, and tries to be both universalist and Christian.
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Moreover, Raue notes that quantitative signs (signa quantitativa) such as omnis (all, every), quicunque (whoever), and nullus (none), include the demonstrative pronouns ille, is, … which are also formal parts of the proposition omitted in ordinary language. 7 Finally, in syllogistic propositions, singular propositions should be analysed as universal. Once the proposition Homo est animal is formally analysed, it will be reformulated as follows (using bars to separate the proposition's parts): Omnis qui / est homo / est is, qui / est animal. The logical copula which appears in this formulation expresses the extensional sameness of the subject of predication. In other words, the sameness of A and B expressed by the proposition 'an A is B' means that A is said of a thing and B is said of the same thing (the commune tertium); both A and B are predicated of the same subject or commune tertium. The most powerful of the objections is this: if three [entities] are different from one another, and any one of them is God, it follows that there are three Gods. For if the father is God, and the son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, and the father is not the son, nor the Holy Spirit; and the Son is not the father or the Holy Spirit, and lastly the Holy Spirit is not the father or the son; either it will have to be said that there are three gods or that we do not know what one and many mean, and therefore in just such a manner it may even be denied that father, son, and grandson are three men; or, the reason will have to be adduced as to why we call these three men, and deny that those are three gods. We shall reply, although the father is not the son, yet the father is he who is [est is qui est] the son, namely, the one God in number. This cannot be said of two men, father and son, and this is the real reason for the difference. (A VI iv 2291-2)
In other texts, Leibniz claims that the apparent contradiction of Trinitarian formulations "is taken away by a distinction", 11 namely the distinction (common in Protestant scholastic theology) between Deus absolute seu essentialiter sumtus ('God' taken in an absolute or in an essential sense) and Deus relative seu personaliter sumtus ('God' taken in a relative or a personal sense). 12 Leibniz notes that in the propositions "the Father is God, the son is God, the Holy Spirit is God," the word 'God' has a different sense than the word 'God' which appears in the proposition "only one is God [Unus est Deus]." The former means Deus relative seu personaliter sumtus; the latter means Deus absolute seu essentialiter sumtus.
Although Deus relative seu personaliter sumtus and Deus absolute seu essentialiter sumtus refer really to the same entity, they cannot be substituted for one another salva veritate because they appear in contexts which "concern not the thing but the mode of conceiving it" Assuming Leibniz is successful in clearing the Trinity and the Incarnation of charges of contradiction, how does he propose to explain these two mysteries "as much as is needed in order to believe them"? As any Christian thinker wishing to remain within the boundaries of orthodoxy, Leibniz is well aware of the need to avoid the two opposite dangers of modalism and tritheism. Orthodoxy requires a combination of monotheism with some real subsistence of the divine persons. Leibniz's distinctive proposal is to talk of three relative substances constituting -"so to speak" (ut sic dicam) --one absolute substance. In the Examen Religionis Christianae, written in 1686, he states: "They are therefore three related singular 13 See Notationes Generales, A VI iv 552-3.
14 Cf. Defensio Trinitatis, A VI i 521. 15 A VI iv 2296. Note that also in this case Leibniz employs the analysis which refers to a commune tertium. The risk of tritheism, however, can also hardly be denied in a model envisaging three relative substances. In 1708, responding to the attacks of an anti-Trinitarian, Leibniz stresses that only the subsistens absolutum (absolute subsistent) can properly be called substance.
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The divine persons, therefore, are said to be substances only in a loose sense of the word. The difference between absolute substance and relative substance seems to be that the latter cannot exist on its own due to its "essential relation" to the other persons. The Trinity seems therefore to be conceived as a concrete, complex system, implying constituents but not parts.
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But what should one make of these notions of relative versus absolute substance in the context of Leibniz's metaphysics? If we turn to the notion of a possible world, it seems that also in this case we have a complex system the strong unity of which results from essential relations of everything to everything. Leibniz even uses strikingly Trinitarian language to describe this universal harmony, calling it on occasion the "perichōrēsis of all things". 23 Such an analogy between a possible world and the individual substances which constitute it, on the one hand, and the absolute versus relative substances of which Leibniz speaks in the case of the Trinity, on the other, seems to yield (at least prima facie) a frankly Spinozistic picture.
The difference between the two cases, however, is significant. In the case of an individual substance, there is no metaphysical impossibility preventing it existing on its own as a "world apart". The fact that there is no solitary monad is down to moral necessity rather than metaphysical necessity. Metaphysically, the proper substance remains the individual substance rather than the world. In the case of the Trinity, Leibniz seems to indicate (in line with orthodoxy) that the impossibility for each person to exist without the others is instead metaphysical. Hence, it is only the subsistens absolutum which is properly a substancenamely, the "absolute substance which is only one in number, but which involves
[complectitur] three persons of the Godhead" (A VI iv 2364). 
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The same balancing act between the requirements of orthodoxy and the attempt to provide a metaphysically consistent model, is apparent in Leibniz's account of the mystery of the intrinsic unity of a substantial being. 27 On the other hand, especially in his later years and in the correspondence with Bartholomew Des Bosses, it becomes increasingly doubtful whether his mature metaphysics has the resources to fulfill this requirement. The problem Leibniz is grappling with is whether in the framework of his monadology any composite being could be granted, with metaphysical rigour, the status of substance. Of course he often writes of corporeal substances; but can aggregates of monads unified by a dominating monad really be regarded as endowed with the intrinsic unity needed for substantiality? In so far as Christ is an even more complex composite being, the problem is exacerbated. It is not, however, a problem unique to the Incarnation. Quite the opposite: it affects all the traditional primary substances of a broadly Aristotelian metaphysics. Leibniz seems to remain conspicuously unconcerned about ensuring that his metaphysical system has the resources for granting the status of substances to plants, animals, and embodied human beings. He seems in fact content with the thought that the dominating monad of these composite beings is a substance, without any pressing need to account for a substantial union with the changing body (that is, aggregate of subordinate monads) that always accompany it.
In the case of the Incarnation, however, there is a requirement for substantial union that his monadological model cannot explain. Leibniz does not deny the possibility of such a stronger union as a truth above reason, but finally retreats from his youthful ambition of providing a positive metaphysical model (however imperfect) of the Incarnation. Two further core doctrines of the Christian tradition directly connected with the metaphysics of bodies are the resurrection and the Eucharist. In the framework of Leibniz's philosophy, the resurrection of bodies turns out to be remarkably easy to explain and, at the same time, remarkably at odds with the intentions of this traditional doctrine. According to tradition, the dead will be resurrected on the day of the Last Judgement, when our immortal souls will be reunited with our bodies. Underpinning this doctrine is a philosophical anthropology according to which the human being is not merely an immortal soul accidentally united to a mortal body for a limited period of time. If this were the case, the immortality of the soul would be sufficient to account for human beings' everlasting life without needing the postulation of a bodily resurrection bound to arouse all sorts of awkward philosophical problems. Instead, deeply ingrained in the Jewish and Christian tradition is the view that embodiment is an essential constituent of human beings. Also in the changed circumstances of heavenly life, the immortal soul which continues to live while our mortal earthly body decays, does not constitute, on its own, our human nature. Therefore, soul's immortality is not sufficient to ensure the preservation of our full identity. The nature and identity of a human being can be fully restored only through her/his resurrection as an embodied being. A crucial consequence of this view is that our earthly death is a real death, a real dissolution of a human being, as opposed to a transformation (however drastic) of the way of life of an immortal self. Furthermore, a proper resurrection (as opposed to a reincarnation) requires that human beings "will rise again with their own bodies which they now bear," as opposed to any odd body.
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Resurrection and Eucharist
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While Scripture does not enter into much detail as to how one might think of this bodily resurrection, from early on the challenge for philosophical theology has been to provide an account which can answer (at the least to some extent) some obvious philosophical questions. The Apostolic Creed's formulation, according to which there will be a "resurrection of the flesh," has traditionally been taken as a claim that also the mortal aspects of our nature ('the flesh') will come to life again. Already Paul clarifies, however, that the resurrected body will be a 'transfigurated' body, namely a 'glorious' or even a 'spiritual' body 31 that, unlike our earthly, corruptible, coarse body of flesh and bones, will be endowed with immortality. 32 In both the letter and the essay, Leibniz seems to take his cue from Paul's notion of "a bare kernel" to speculate about a metaphysical model according to which in "everything" (that is, not only in human beings and animals, but also in vegetables and minerals) there is a "kernel of substance [Kern der substantz]" (A II 2 i 175) or a "certain selfdiffusing seminal centre" (A II 2 i 185). This kernel is "so subtle, that it remains also in the ashes of burned things, and can, as it were, draw itself into an invisible centre" (A II 2 i 175).
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In the course of his letter and essay, Leibniz employs also the expressions punctum saliens, "fountain of life," and "flower of substance" to indicate the survival of a subtle, indestructible bodily kernel or bodily essence capable of retreating into a point (A II 2 i 184-5 and A II 2 i 175). 34 In turn, this point is further qualified in his letter to the Duke as a "physical point" 31 Cf. Phil 3:21: "Dominum Iesum Christum, qui transfigurabit corpus humilitatis nostrae, ut illud conforme faciat corpori gloriae suae" and 1 Cor 15:44: "seminatur corpus animale, resurgit corpus spirituale". serving as "an instrument and as though a vehicle of the soul" which is "constituted in a mathematical point" (A II 2 i 176). From this point --in which also the soul is supposed to be somehow "implanted" (A II 2 i 184) --a human being can unfold again at the moment of the resurrection.
The metaphysical picture painted by Leibniz in these youthful texts is heavily indebted to alchemical notions and far from straightforward. However, despite its immaturity and strange details, the thought behind this model seems to be clear enough. Our earthly visible bodies, Leibniz reasons, "are in perpetual flux" (A II 2 i 184). Even here on earth, our identity therefore does not depend on the preservation of the same coarse matter. Given that, following Paul's teaching, the body is due to be resurrected as a "spiritual body," the restoration of the same gross body is not a requirement for our bodily resurrection. 35 The survival of an indestructible kernel or flower of bodily essence, united in an invisible point with our soul and capable of unfolding again, is therefore sufficient to preserve the identity of a human being and to explain the resurrection.
During the following years, the evolution of Leibniz's metaphysics of bodies leaves behind the musings about alchemical bodily spirits and essences which characterize these early pieces. Rather than fully abandoning his youthful model, however, Leibniz's mature body. 37 Death is merely a regression into a state of stupor or unconsciousness similar to the state of all "bare" monads which enjoy no apperception or distinct representations. 38 It is easy enough to see how monads can be awoken from this slumber. At the resurrection they will resume (and presumably greatly improve) their distinct perceptions: they will even grow their bodies again -that is to say, they will perceive more distinctly the changing aggregate of mind-like simple substances which they represent as their bodies.
In In sum, Leibniz's mature metaphysics appears to be uniquely well placed to give content to Paul's claim that our resurrected bodies will be "spiritual bodies". In Leibniz's monadological framework, all bodies ultimately reduce to "spiritual" bodies, that is, aggregates of mind-like simple substances. Claiming that they can rise again no longer seems to pose a problem. The price to be paid for such a neat picture is, however, very high, indeed 37 Cf. Principles of Nature and of Grace (GP VI 598-599): "each distinct simple substance or monad, which forms the centre of a composite substance (for example, of an animal) and the principle of its oneness, is surrounded by a mass composed of an infinity of other monads, which constitute the body belonging to this central monad". In his fifth piece for Samuel Clarke, 
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so high that it arguably does away with the very doctrine which is supposed to be neatly explained. As Leibniz himself proudly notes in some remarks of 1712, amongst the accomplishments of his theory of substance there is the "banishment of death." will of the Catholic side towards his metaphysical theories, rather than being an issue which really demanded, in his view, a satisfactory solution. Accordingly, Leibniz frankly points out to his friend that Lutherans only need to account for the real presence of Christ's body, not for transubstantiation. 42 On closer inspection, however, the problems raised by transubstantiation expose more general problems about the ability of Leibniz's theory of monads to account for the existence of genuine corporeal substances, as well as for mysteries to which he was committed (such as the Incarnation).
Leibniz's first stab at explaining to Des Bosses how his monadology could accommodate transubstantiation is to suggest that "when the monads constituting the bread are destroyed with respect to their primitive active and passive powers, and the presence of the monads constituting Christ's body is substituted for them, there remain only the derivative forces that were in the bread exhibiting the same phenomena that the monads of the bread had exhibited." (LDB 152-3) Des Bosses appreciates the similarity of this proposal to the doctrine of "real accidents" employed by Catholic theologians to explain transubstantiation, namely, the claim that there can be "absolute" or non-modal accidents which remain in the Eucharist without a subject. He questions, however, the consistency of this view with Leibniz's metaphysical system. Since derivative forces are conceived as modifications of primitive forces, how can they remain when the latter are destroyed? (LDB
158-9).
Leibniz is quick to see the point. He abandons the suggestion of a destruction of monads and their primitive forces, trying instead a different tack. In his letter to Des Bosses of 15 February 1712, the hypothesis of a "real unifier superadded to monads by God" is introduced. This first version of the vinculum substantiale appears to envisage some kind of bond holding together the simple substances which compose a corporeal substance, thereby bestowing the unity a corporeal substance would require if it has to be "something real over and above monads" (LDB 224-5). The idea is that transubstantiation no longer rests on the destruction of monads. Since a corporeal substance depends on the presence of this substantial bond, in order to create a new corporeal substance it is enough for God to substitute one vinculum with another. 43 Leibniz's problems, however, are far from over. The vinculum cannot be merely a relation, given that relations for him are mental entities, namely, second order truths resulting from the simultaneous consideration of two or more individuals with their properties. The bond envisaged by Leibniz's proposal clearly needs to have some substantial status of its own: it needs to be, in Leibniz's own phrase, a substantial bond or a "unifying reality, which adds something absolute (and therefore substantial), albeit impermanent, to the things to be unified." (LDB 226-7)
In later letters, the character of substance (as opposed to relation) of the vinculum takes over, 44 marking sharp divisions not only between Catholics, Lutherans (or Evangelicals), and
Reformed churches, but also inside these Christian denominations. 49 The distinction between alternative positions is typically drawn along the lines of a different balance between two competing concerns of Christian theology: on the one hand, the essential role played in salvation by God's grace (blocking the Pelagian view that human beings can redeem themselves by dint of good works); on the other hand, the role of human beings' response to God's grace (blocking worries about God's arbitrariness and injustice in saving some but not others independently of a human response to His offer of redemption).
Amongst the most harshly contested issues in the Protestant camp was the so-called doctrine of double predestination, espoused by Calvinists following the teaching of Calvin's successor in Geneva, Theodor Beza (1519-1605). According to Beza, from all eternity God has decreed not only who will be saved but also who will be damned, in contrast to the common view held by Lutheran churches according to which there is predestination to salvation but not to damnation. By the early seventeenth century, the Calvinist or Reformed churches further divided themselves between those denying any role to human beings' response to grace in determining their salvation, and those upholding the role of human free will in resisting a salvific grace which is offered to all. Whereas for the former God saves only those he has elected independently of their merits or demerits, for the latter God wants the salvation of all but some human beings condemn themselves but refusing God's grace. God, whether ordinary or extraordinary, has its degrees and its measures; in itself, it is always efficacious in producing a certain proportionate effect, and, further, it is always sufficient, not only to secure us from sin, but even to produce salvation, assuming that man unites himself to it by what derives from him. But it is not always sufficient to overcome man's inclinations, for otherwise he would have nothing more to strive for; this is reserved solely for the absolutely efficacious grace which is always victorious, whether it is so by itself or by way of appropriate circumstances."
by contrary circumstances (as they appear to have been in the miraculous conversion of The main distinction here, endorsed also by Leibniz, is the well-established one between (objective) sufficient grace and (subjective) efficacious grace. Leibniz embraces a universalist position according to which sufficient grace is given to all. 53 That is to say, with his antecedent or absolute will, God wants all to be saved and gives to all sufficient grace to resist sin. This grace, however, does not obtain in all the same effects due to the different circumstances in which human beings find themselves, and their response to these circumstances. In theological terms, although all are granted sufficient grace, whether this grace is efficacious in leading to salvation depends also on human beings' responses to their varying circumstances. It remains open to God, however, to bestow a special type of efficacious grace which is always per se infallible.
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Given that the efficacy of grace normally depends, for Leibniz, also on the circumstances dictated by the order which governs the best of all possible worlds, it hardly need to be said that, in the context of his strict determinism, the usual problems raised by the relationship between grace and human responsibility become particularly acute. In his early Confessio Philosophi (1672-1673) Leibniz shows himself intensely aware of the pressure put by the "lament of the damned" on his theodicy project:
this inexorable difficulty is placed before us, whatever sophistry we may employ: the apparent justice of the lament of the damned, that they were born in such a way, sent into the world in such a way, came upon such times, persons, and occasions that they
were not able not to perish; their minds, occupied prematurely by vicious thoughts, existed in circumstances that favored evil, that stimulated evil; they lacked circumstances that would have released them, that would have restrained them, as if the fates conspired in the ruin of the wretched … they curse the series of the universe, which also involves them. Leibniz is careful to stress that punishment consists in nothing else than this very hatred of God persistently chosen by the sinner. Moreover, the infinity of the sinner's punishment is justified by the perpetual continuation of his sinning:
even if we should concede that no sin is infinite in itself, it can still be said that the sins of the damned are infinite in number, because they persist in sin throughout all eternity.
Therefore if sins are eternal, it is just that the punishments should be eternal too. deter people from sinning. 60 On the other hand, he also expresses doubts about the actual usefulness of this doctrine in preventing sin, as well as dismay at the readiness with which some theologians regard the damnation of others as an edifying thought:
Mr Arnauld … finds it strange that so many millions of pagans have not been condemned; I would find it much stranger if they had been: I don't know why we are so inclined to believe that people are damned or sunk in eternal miseries, even if they could not help it; but this leads to thoughts hardly compatible with the goodness and justice of God … I don't believe that the opinion of the eternal damnation of so many virtually innocent people is so edifying and so useful in preventing sin as is imagined. It 
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are those who accord salvation to pagans, or to others who lack the ordinary aids, thereby obliged to rely for this on natural processes alone … One can, after all, maintain that, when God gives them grace sufficient to call forth an act of contrition, he also gives them before their death, even if only in the final moments, all the light of faith and all the fervour of love which they need for salvation; this being given to them either explicitly or dispositionally, but in any case supernaturally. 63 In De Salvatione Ethnicorum, written by 1698, he maintains that it is false that pagans can be saved without Christ "because no one is able to love God above all things except he who understands that this is the greatest good to him, but no one understands this except a
Christian." However, "if we imagine that there has been a love of God above all things in any of the pagans," the person who loved in this way would be saved -albeit not merely through natural powers. Leibniz's point is not that pagans cannot be saved but that anyone who loves
